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MILITARY DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS
OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION:
"DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL" AND THE
SOLOMON AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Governmentfor a redressof grievances.'
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any
2
laws.
the
of
protection
equal
the
person..,
Our Constitution protects us from arbitrary laws, helps us pursue
equality, and preserves what our society views as fundamental rights.
Recently, the recognition of these rights for a minority group, often
the target of discriminatory treatment and subjected to violence for
their non-traditional sexual preferences, has come to the forefront of
national concern. 3 Although an increasing number of people support
the rights of homosexual individuals, 4 there still exists a growing and

1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3. See Mary Wiltenburg, Out of the Margins, Into the Mainstream,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 10, 2003, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File; PUBLIC AGENDA, GAY RIGHTS: OVERVIEW (2004), at

http://www.publicagenda.org/issues/overview.cfin?issue type=gay-fights.
4. Throughout this Note the author uses the term sexual orientation to
refer to one's preference of partner for intimate association, and the terms
homosexual and gay in the generic sense to refer to those of non-heterosexual
tendency. The author recognizes that categorizing people by sexuality is
imprecise and not fully illustrative, but for purposes of writing the terms are
useful.
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heated debate about whether and how the Constitution seeks to
protect the rights of this minority group.5
The U.S. military policy toward homosexual individuals in the
armed forces fuels this debate. 6 Instead of recognizing society's
increasing acceptance of homosexuality, 7 the U.S. military has
moved backwards. The policies of the U.S. military have shifted
from forbidding homosexual conduct to, in effect, forbidding
homosexual status.8 The military's outright discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation conflicts with society's increasing
acceptance of homosexuality.
Examining the military's policy of discrimination in the context
of on-campus university recruitment exemplifies this conflict. Most
universities maintain strong nondiscrimination policies that forbid
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Prior to 1995, law
schools in particular adamantly enforced these policies.' 0 One way
in which law schools showed their commitment to nondiscrimination
was to limit or refuse on-campus recruiting to any employer,
including the U.S. military, that did not comply with the university's
policy.1 '
In an effort to combat the universities' resistance and preserve
military recruitment on university campuses, Congress enacted the
5. See HarrisInteractive, The Harris Poll #9 (Feb. 9, 2000) available at
Wiltenburg,
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harrispoll/index.asp?PID=1/;
supra note 3.
6. The author in no way intends to disparage our military's men and
women, as she greatly appreciates the freedom they protect and knows that as a
civilian she cannot understand the battlefield mentality. However, it is the

author's opinion that societal progress requires that discriminatory regulations
in any facet of society should be discussed, analyzed, and occasionally
challenged.

7. See HarrisInteractive, supra note 5 (fifty-six percent "favor[] legislation
to make it illegal to discriminate against gays and lesbians"); Poll Indicates
Americans Becoming More Accepting of Homosexuals (CNN television
broadcast, June 13, 2001) (interview with Frank Newport, The Gallup Poll's
editor in chief), at http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com[TRANSCRIPTS/0106/13/
ns.05.html; Sean Macaulay, High Time that Gay Time is Prime Time, TIMES
LoNDON, July 24, 2003, availableat LEXIS, News Library, Ttimes File.
8. See infra Part H.A.
9. Sylvia Law, Civil Rights Under Attack by the Military, 7 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL'Y 117, 120-21 (2001).
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See id.
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Solomon Amendment,12 which requires universities to allow3 the
military to recruit on campus or risk the loss of federal funding.'
This Note argues that the Solomon Amendment is an
unconstitutional condition because it forces each university to choose
between the constitutional right to function as an expressive
association and hundreds of millions of dollars in federal research
funding. Part II introduces the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy,
which is the basis of the military's express discrimination against
homosexuals. It lays out the history of military discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation as well as the constitutionality and
sensibility (or lack thereof) of this discrimination. Part III discusses
the Solomon Amendment's history and the financial and social costs
associated with it. Part IV concludes that the Solomon Amendment
is an unconstitutional condition because it forces the choice between
First Amendment rights and federal funds, and is not justified by a
compelling government interest or military goal furthered by the
least restrictive means.
II. "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL"

A. The Military'sPolicy on Homosexuality
The military maintains a clear policy, codified in Title 10 of the
U.S. Code, of discrimination based on sexual orientation. This
policy states:
A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the
armed forces.., if one or more of the following findings is
made...
(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage
in, or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or
acts unless there are further findings... that the member
has demonstrated that(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's
usual and customary behavior;
12. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000).
13. See infra Part III; Statement by Carl Monk, AALS Executive Director,
to Deans of AALS Member and Fee-Paid Schools, Military Recruiting at Law
School Career Services Offices (Aug. 13, 1997), at http://www.aals.org/
military.html.
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(B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is
unlikely to recur;
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of
force, coercion, or intimidation;
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the
member's continued presence in the armed forces is
consistent with the interests of the armed forces in
proper discipline, good order, and morale; and
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts.
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a
homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect, unless there
is a further finding.., that the member has demonstrated
that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to
engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to
engage in homosexual acts.
(3) That the member has married or attempted to marry a
person known to be of the same biological sex. 14
The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was enacted in 1993 as a
of
compromise
between society's increasing acceptance
homosexuality and the military's concerns for unit cohesion and
morale. 15 Historically, military "prohibitions focused on typically
14. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000).
15. Gregory M. Herek, Social Science, Sexual Orientation, and Military

Personnel Policy, in OUT IN FORCE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE

3, 5-8 (Gregory M. Herek et al. eds., 1996). The military has long
maintained some policy of discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.
Unit cohesion and morale were also the reasons presented in the mid-1900s to
keep black soldiers separate from white soldiers. Michael R. Kauth & Dan
MILITARY

Landis, Applying Lessons Learnedfrom MinorityIntegration in the Military, in

supra note 15, at
86, 88; Patricia J. Thomas & Marie D. Thomas, Integration of Women in the
OUT IN FORCE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE MILITARY,

Military: Parallels to the Progress of Homosexuals?, in

OUT IN FORCE:

supra note 15, at 65, 75. "It took
an Executive Order in 1945 by President Truman, issued against the advice of
almost every admiral and general, to integrate our armed forces." Watkins v.
United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 729 n.32 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring) (citing M. MILLER, PLAIN SPEAKING: AN ORAL BIOGRAPHY OF
HARRY S. TRUMAN 79 (1983)). When the armed forces began to desegregate,
there was racial tension, but this subsided when the military instituted
"programs designed to address racial inequities and reduce interracial
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE MILITARY,
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homosexual behaviors.., not on gay identity."' 6 For example, in
1950 Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which
codified the rules of the armed forces, including the criminalization
of sodomy. 17 However,
in subsequent decades the focus shifted to
8
homosexual status.'
By the mid 1980s the military made clear that homosexuality
was incompatible with "discipline, good order, and morale."' 19
Recruits were openly questioned about their sexuality. 20
The
military argued that homophobic men may lash out or refuse to
interact with homosexual men, may not follow orders from a
conflict." Herek, supra note 15, at 5. The same was true when the military
integrated women into its ranks. Id. But after initial challenges, the armed
forces have shown that they can weather adversity and come out stronger than
before due to the added diversity. See Kauth & Landis, supra note 15, at 8788. A new study indicates "the armed forces have a long history of
successfully integrating minority groups that faced considerable prejudice in
the civilian sector." Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military,
U.S. Military A Major Success in Integration and Diversity, Study Finds as
Affirmative Action Debate Heats Up, Military Stands Out in Successful
Integration of Wide Variety of Minorities (June 25, 2003), at
http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/PressCenter/pressrel-2003_0625.htm.
However, military officials claim racial integration was an exception. Id.
Nonetheless, the military has continually refused to take steps towards
integrating those of varying sexual orientations.
16. Herek, supra note 15, at 5.
17. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 141 (codified as amended at 10
U.S.C. § 925 (2000)). Section 925 states:
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal
copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex or with an
animal is guilty of sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient
to complete the offense.
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished as a courtmartial may direct.
10 U.S.C. § 925 (2000).
18. Herek, supra note 15, at 6.
19. Id. at 6-7 (citing Department of Defense Directive 1332.14 (Jan. 28,
1982)).
20. See Human Rights Campaign, Fact Sheet on Don't Ask, Don't Tell,
Don't Pursue, Don't Harass, available at http://www.hrc.org/Content/
NavigationMenu/HRC/GetInformed/Issues/Military2/FactSheetsDontAsk
_DontTell/Don'tAsk,_DontTellFactSheet.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2004); Department of Defense Directive 1332.14 (Dec. 21, 1993), availableat
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/dl 33214wchl_122193/d 133214
p.pdf (this policy change restricted military personnel from asking recruits
about their sexuality).

1336

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 37:1331

homosexual commander, and may feel they have lost some of their
privacy. 2 1
Various independent reports concluded that
homosexuality would not, or should not, interfere with unit cohesion,
but the military rejected these conclusions. 22 Congress and the
courts deferred to the military's position, and the majority of
discharges based on sexual orientation have been upheld.23
Nevertheless, in recent decades the acceptance of homosexuality
has increased in society.24 Thus, the outright military policy of
questioning cadets about their sexual orientation became
questionable in the 1990s. During his presidential campaign, soon to
be President Clinton promised to lift the ban on homosexuals in the
military.25 But once in office, President Clinton's campaign promise
to integrate gays and lesbians into the military caused so much
opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Congress that the
deference afforded to the military became clear; "Don't Ask, Don't

21. Thomas & Thomas, supra note 15, at 74-77.
22. See Timothy Haggerty, History Repeating Itself.A HistoricalOverview
of Gay Men and Lesbians in the Military Before "Don 't Ask, Don't Tell," in
DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL: DEBATING THE GAY BAN IN THE MILITARY 22-24,

37-38 (Aaron Belkin & Geoffrey Bateman eds., 2003) (discussing the 1950s
Crittenden Board Report and 1980s PERSEREC report); Herek, supra note 15,
at 8 (discussing the 1993 RAND report); GARY L. LEHRING, OFFICIALLY GAY:
THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY BY THE U.S. MILITARY

132-33

(2003) (discussing the 1992 GAO report and the 1993 RAND report). The
GAO Report is available at http://archive.gao.gov/d33t10/146980.pdf. The
RAND Report is available at www.rand.org/publications/MRlMR323.
23. See, e.g., Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1997) ("For
nearly twenty years we have upheld the constitutionality of the military's
authority to discharge service members who engage in homosexual acts.");
Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980). It is true that any review
of military regulations "is far more deferential than constitutional review of
similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society" because military
service requires "subordination of [individual] desires and interests." Goldman
v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986). However, the Supreme Court "ha[s]
never abdicated [its] obligation of judicial review." Id. at 515 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). "[O]ur citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights
simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes." Chappell v. Wallace,
462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (citing Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the
Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 188 (1962)). One might question whether
continued recognition of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is an abdication.
24. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
25. Herek, supra note 15, at 7-8.
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Tell" was eventually enacted as a compromise between competing
values.26
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" has been justified in part by the
military's ban on sodomy.27 Officials claim that the policy does not
affect people that have a sexual preference for those of the same sex,
but instead affects only those who engage in, or have a propensity to
engage in, gay acts.28 However, stating that one is gay creates a
presumption of propensity to engage in homosexual acts and is
reason enough for discharge. 29 Thus, status is in effect regulated.
The sodomy justification is being called into question as a result of
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas.30
26. Id. at 8; Bruce Bartley, Conflicts and Opportunities: The Role of the
Armed Forces in Modern Democratic Societies, Paper for the 51st Political

Studies Association Conference Apr. 10-12, 2001, Manchester, United

Kingdom, 7-8, availableat www.psa.ac.uk/cps/2001/Bartley 0/20Bruce.pdf.
27. Scott Morris, Europe Enters a New Millennium with Gays in the
Military While the United States Drowns in Don't Ask, Don 't Tell: Twin
Decisions By the European Court of Human Rights, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 423, 431-32 (2001).
28. See Peter D. Jacobson, Sexual Orientationand the Military: Some Legal
Considerations,in OUT IN FORCE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE MILITARY,

supra note 15, at 39, 40 (discussing the Clinton Administration's intent to
focus "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" on homosexual conduct while creating a "'zone
of privacy' around the soldier's private sexual status"); Lawrence J. Korb, The
President, the Congress, and the Pentagon: Obstacles to Implementing the
"Don 't Ask, Don 't Tell" Policy, in OUT IN FORCE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
THE MILITARY, supra note 15, at 290 (arguing that President Clinton
misframed the policy of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" as "status versus conduct"
rather than the "real issue... [of] status versus misconduct"). Department of
Defense Directive 1332.14
E2.1.6.1 defines a homosexual act as "[a]ny
bodily contact... between members of the same sex for the purpose of
satisfying sexual desires." Department of Defense Directive 1332.14
E2.1.6.1 (Dec. 21, 1993) available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/pdf/d133214wchl 122193/d133214p.pdf.; see also Janet Lever &
David E. Kanouse, Sexual Orientation and ProscribedSexual Behaviors, in
OUT IN FORCE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE MILITARY, supra note 15, at
17.
29. Department of Defense Directive 1332.14
E3.Al.1.8.1.2.2, at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d133214wchl_122193/dl 33214
p.pdf.
30. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The underlying facts of the case are as follows:
officers were dispatched to Lawrence's residence on a reported weapons
disturbance. Id. at 562. They entered the apartment and observed Lawrence
and another man engaged in sodomy. Id. at 563. The officer arrested the two
men pursuant to Texas Penal Code section 21.06(a), which provided "[a]
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In Lawrence the Supreme Court struck down the Texas antisodomy law and overturned Bowers v. Hardwick,3 ' thus eliminating
two related grounds for upholding regulations that discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation. 32 First, in trying to justify
discriminatory regulations on something more than morality, many
have argued that a particular regulation is acceptable because
homosexual conduct, sodomy, is a criminal offense. 33 But with the
elimination of sodomy from the criminal law, this justification for
discrimination is eliminated. Second, by overturning Bowers, the
Court eliminated a judicial reason to allow discrimination.34
The effect of Lawrence on military regulations has yet to be
seen. All branches of government afford a significant level of
deference to the military. 35 This is partly a result of history and
tradition, and partly a result of the differences between civilian and
military life. Thus, a proffered legitimate interest presented by the
military may be perfectly acceptable in our legal system even though
the very same interest presented in the civilian context would be
refused. Because of this deference, the military's anti-sodomy law
may just survive. If it does, the military could continue to argue that
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is in furtherance of this policy. On the other
hand, the Court may stand by its assertion that "[l]iberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct. [It] involves liberty of the
person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions. 3 6 In so
person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with
another individual of the same sex." Id.
31. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers, a police officer observed Hardwick in
his own bedroom, engaging in intimate sexual conduct with another adult
male. Id. at 187-88. The conduct was in violation of a Georgia statute that
criminalized sodomy, regardless of the sex of the participants. Id. Hardwick
was not prosecuted, but he brought an action in federal court to declare the
statute invalid. Id. at 188. The Court upheld the statute, concluding that it did

not violate due process. Id. at 186.
32. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see discussion supra note 23.
33. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568-72.

34. Numerous courts have relied on Bowers to uphold discriminatory
regulations. See Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193 (4th Cir.
1990); Marcum v. McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635, 641-42 (6th Cir. 2002);
Flaskamp v. Dearborn Pub. Schs., 232 F. Supp. 2d 730, 741-42 (E.D. Mich.
2002).
35. See Jacobson, supra note 28; discussion supranote 23.
36. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
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doing the Court could recognize that the line between the civilian
and the military does not justify the military's anti-sodomy law.3 7
B. The Constitutionalityof "Don't
Ask, Don 't Tell"
The following section is a brief overview of the constitutional
questions that arise in the evaluation of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (and
other regulations that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation).
It is not an exhaustive analysis but is instead intended as an
introduction and as a foundation for additional reading and research.
Two areas of constitutional law are key in determining the
constitutionality of regulations that discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation: due process and equal protection. 38 "The due
process clause.., protects practices which are 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition.' The equal protection clause, in
contrast, protects minorities from discriminatory treatment at the
hands of the majority. '39 The analysis of these two clauses in sexual
orientation cases may change as a result of Lawrence v. Texas.4 °
Due process is concerned with fundamental rights-those
inalienable rights so deeply rooted in history and tradition that they
define our very concept of liberty. 41 Recognition of "new"
fundamental due process rights is a high hurdle.42 In the last few
decades, liberty has been construed to include privacy, personhood,
the right to marry and establish a home, to acquire knowledge, and to
pursue happiness. 43 However, most of these fundamental rights have
thus far applied only to heterosexuals.
37. It is helpful to keep in mind that the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
does not just regulate what happens in the barracks or while a soldier is on
base. It may be perfectly acceptable for the military to regulate all sexual
conduct while in the barracks, surrounded by dozens of people. But the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy reaches beyond this; it affects conduct off base, in a
soldier's private home, and even the thoughts and feelings of soldiers.

It

declares that if a soldier has a desire for homosexual activity or
companionship, he or she is not fit for duty. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
39. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring).
40. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
41. 16B AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 911 (1998).

42. See id.
43. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15-1 to

15-3, at 1302-11 (2d ed. 1988); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
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Extension of fundamental rights to homosexuals is hotly
disputed. General benefits and rights afforded to heterosexual
couples, such as hospital visitation and health benefits, have
consistently been denied to same-sex couples. 44 While a few states
have enacted domestic partnership and civil union laws that increase
the rights available to same-sex couples, the rights afforded are not
equal to those that arise with marriage. 45 Furthermore, it is currently
disputed whether such laws will be given full faith and credit in other
states.46 An amendment to the Constitution has even been proposed
(holding that a law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
persons was in conflict with fundamental human rights); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a state law prohibiting the use
of and counseling regarding the use of contraceptive drugs and devices);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that liberty "denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual...
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"); 16B AM. JUR. 2D
ConstitutionalLaw § 892.
44. David Von Drehle, Same-Sex Unions Move Center Stage; After a
Decade on Fringe, Gay Marriage Enters American Consciousness, WASH.
POST, Nov. 23, 2003, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, Wash. Post
File, 2003 WL 67888204.
45. California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Vermont have varying levels of
protection for same-sex partners. See, e.g., California Secretary of State Kevin
Shelley, Domestic PartnersRegistry, at http://www.ss.ca.gov/dpregistry/ (last
visited Feb. 16, 2004); Rose Arce, Massachusetts Court Upholds Same-Sex
Marriage (Feb. 6, 2004), at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/04/
gay.marriage/; Equality California, Domestic Partnerships:State of the Law in
California, available at http://eqca.org/press/releases/ab205._dpbrochure.pdf
(last visited Jan. 16, 2004); Hawaii Department of Health, Vital Records:
About Reciprocal Beneficiary Relationships, available at http://www.state.hi.
us/doh/records/rbrfaq.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2004); Vermont Civil
Union.com, Vermont Civil Union Resource Guide, available at http://
www.vermontcivilunion.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2004); Vermont Secretary
of State Deborah L. Markowitz, Municipal Information: Civil Unions /
Marriage, at http://www.sec.state.vt.us/municipal/civil-mar.htm (last visited
Feb. 16, 2004); see also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,
957 (Mass. 2003) (civil union not equal).
46. The U.S. Constitution guarantees Full Faith and Credit by each state for
the acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. U.S. CONST. art.
IV, sec. 1. However, Congress has declared that "No State... shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other State... respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that
is treated as marriage under the laws of such other State ... or a right or claim
arising from such relationship." Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c)).
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to prevent recognition of homosexual unions by defining marriage as
a union between a man and a woman and limiting the benefits of
marriage to legally married couples.47
Lawrence may provide an avenue for the extension of the
fundamental right of privacy to homosexuals. In Lawrence the
majority of the Court resolved the case by examining whether "the
petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the
exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.""4 The Court reviewed prior decisions that
illustrate the reach of the Due Process Clause, concluding with a
thorough review of Bowers v. Hardwick.49 In Bowers the Court
While states can afford full faith and credit, it is unclear whether many will.
See Marriage Laws, Alternative Lifestyles: Same Sex Marriage, http://
usmarriagelaws.com/search/altemativelifestyles/samesex_marriage/index.s.h
tml; Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat 2419, 28 U.S.C.
1738(c).
47. S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003) ("Marriage in the United States shall
consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution or

the Constitution of any State, nor State or Federal law, shall be construed to
require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
unmarried couples or groups."); see also CBS News.com, Gay MarriageBattle
Drawn (July 31, 2003), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2003/08/03/politics/printable566402.shtml. In July 2004, the U.S. Senate
rejected the proposed amendment, but the House plans to go ahead with a
symbolic vote on the issue in fall 2004 nonetheless. Susan Milligan, Senate
Rejects Gay MarriageAmendment, BOSTON GLOBE, Jul. 15, 2004, at Al. In
February 2004, San Francisco City Hall officials issued hundreds of marriage
licenses and wed more than 2,500 same-sex couples notwithstanding the fact
that California law defines marriage as between a man and a woman. CAL.
FAM. CODE § 308.5 (2004); CNN.com, Same-sex MarriageDecisionsDelayed
(Feb. 18, 2004), at http:// www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/17/samesex.marriage/
index.html. In August 2004, the California Supreme Court ruled that San
Francisco's mayor overstepped his authority by issuing the licenses and voided
the marriages, but the court did not resolve whether same-sex marriage was
constitutional; it only addressed whether local officials could bypass
California's judicial and legislative branches. David Kravetz, California
Supreme Court Voids Gay Marriages in San Francisco, Saying Mayor
OversteppedAuthority, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 12, 2004.
48. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
49. Id. at 564-78. The Court attacked the formulation of the issue in
Bowers as discussed in the text, as well as the historical data upon which that
decision relied. The Lawrence court recognized that Bowers was making the
"broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn
homosexual conduct as immoral." Id. at 571. However, it also recognized the
stigma of criminality and that "[t]he issue is whether the majority may use the
Lines

1342

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1331

asked whether the "Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy." 50 However, the Lawrence Court
recognized that this formulation of the issue "demean[ed] the claim
the individual put forward." 5' While the text of the law seemed to
simply prohibit a sexual act, the penalties of the law, and the
purposes underlying the law, had "more far-reaching consequences,
touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and
in the most private of places, the home., 5 2 The Lawrence Court thus
recognized the importance of the purpose and effect of the law,
instead of relying
solely on the actual text, and concluded that liberty
53
choice.
allows
Some commentators see Lawrence as a keystone decision, the
beginning of a new era of fundamental rights.5 4 Others are wary of
whether it will-have much effect at all, 55primarily because it did not
address the question of equal protection.
Equal protection is implicated when the majority discriminates
against a minority. The judiciary has developed three tests for
measuring the constitutionality of a discriminatory regulation: (1)
rational basis; (2) intermediate scrutiny; and (3) strict scrutiny.
Policies that affect sexual orientation and other categories that the
nation has yet to recognize as deserving of extra protection are

power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through
operation of the criminal law." Id.
50. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
51. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
52. Id.
53. Id. "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence." Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). "Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The
instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more
transcendent dimensions." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
54. See Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, Legal
Scholars Question Whether Sodomy Ruling Will Affect Military Gay Ban (June
26, 2003), at http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/PressCenter/press-rel 2003_
0626.htm.
55. See, e.g., Stephen A. Allen, Gay Rights: Separate but Equal?, at
http://www.h-net.msu.edu/-hns/articles/2003/070803b.html (last visited Feb.
16, 2004) (noting that by not addressing Equal Protection, Lawrence v. Texas
"leaves the door open to certain types of discrimination").
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reviewed with the lowest threshold standard-rational basis review.5 6
Under rational basis review courts ask only (1) whether the
government has some legitimate interest; and (2) whether the means
chosen are reasonably related to the goal.57 If both questions are
answered affirmatively, the regulation stands and whatever
discriminatory effect it has is an unfortunate by-product of the
lawmaking process.
In contrast, courts apply intermediate scrutiny to review
discrimination based on gender.58 Judges ask (1) whether there is an
important interest; and (2) whether that interest is substantially
furthered by the classification. 59 And for those categories that are
suspect, such as race and religion, courts apply strict scrutiny to
review anything that intends to, or has the effect of, discriminating
based on these categories. 60 Courts ask (1) whether there is a
compelling state interest; and (2) if so, whether the regulation
6
furthers that interest by using the least discriminatory means. 1
"Getting to yes" when applying intermediate or strict scrutiny is
much tougher than doing so under rational basis review. Courts are
thus more likely to uphold a law under rational basis review. A few
court decisions have manipulated rational basis to look more like
56. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996); Philips v. Perry,
106 F.3d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1997); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec.
Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990).
57. See TRIBE, supra note 43, § 16-2, at 1440.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996).
59. See TRIBE, supra note 43, § 16-32, at 1602-03.
60. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984). Strict
scrutiny is also used to review regulations that "imping[e] directly on access to,
or levels of, those rights deemed fundamental in the sense that departures from
equality in their availability are suspect." TRIBE, supra note 43, § 16-9, at
1458. For example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court
applied strict scrutiny to strike down a state law that provided for sterilization
of twice-convicted felons if their crimes involved moral turpitude, unless the
crimes were embezzlement or a violation of revenue acts. Id. at 541. The
court recognized that procreation is fundamental and within the realm of
personal autonomy, and could not find any compelling reason to uphold the
law. Id. at 541-42; see TRIBE, supra note 43, § 16-12, at 1463-64. In so
deciding, the Court recognized that the Equal Protection clause protects the
citizenry from "classifications unequally distributing access to choices that
ought to be placed beyond government's reach.., because, in government's
hands, control over those choices would pose too great a danger of majoritarian
oppression or enduring subjugation." TRIBE, supra note 43, § 16-12, at 1464.
61. See, e.g., Palmore,466 U.S. at 432-33.
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intermediate or strict scrutiny because to do otherwise would have
been too unjust. 62 However, this sort of "rational basis plus"
analysis, while useful for an occasional victory, does little for longterm protection.
Many have argued that sexual orientation is a suspect class
deserving a heightened level of judicial scrutiny. 63 However, current
jurisprudence dictates that questions of sexual orientation need only
be reviewed pursuant to rational basis. At minimum this means that

62. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (explicitly applying
rational basis, but requiring showing of a substantial state interest to justify
denying a "discrete group of innocent children the free public education that
[the state] offers to other children residing within its borders"); City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447-50 (1985).
63. See, e.g., Renee Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a
Suspect Class, 34 S. TEx. L. REV. 205, 240 (1993); Samuel A. Marcosson,
Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646, 648-49 (2000) (noting
"the wide consensus of scholars that sexual orientation.., should be a suspect
classification subject to the most exacting judicial scrutiny"). Several factors
are reviewed in determining whether a class is suspect: (1) history of
purposeful discrimination; (2) whether the discrimination is invidious; and (3)
whether the group lacks the political power to obtain redress. See Watkins v.
U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724-26 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring);
Culverhouse & Lewis, supra, at 240. Clearly the private and public sectors
have discriminated against homosexuals because of their status-there have
been numerous reports of violence related to homosexuals, of schools and
employers refusing to accept homosexual candidates for jobs, and of same-sex
partners being prevented from marrying. See USATODAY.com, Bill to Ban
Job Discrimination Against Gays Passes (Apr. 24, 2002), at http://
www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2002/04/24/gays.htm.; National Desk,
Houston Police Set Trap to Quell Tide of Violence Against Homosexuals, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1991, at A12, available at LEXIS, News Library, Major
Newspapers File; Religious Tolerance.org, Same-Sex Marriages & Civil
Unions, at http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom-marr.htm (last visited Feb.
18, 2004); Watkins, 875 F.2d at 724 (Norris, J., concurring). Furthermore, this
discrimination is invidious-it is so grossly unfair that it is "inconsistent with
the ideals of equal protection." Id. (Norris, J., concurring). Sexual orientation
does not determine a person's contribution to society, and may be immutable.
While immutability is not required for a class to be suspect, it is an important
consideration. Id. at 725 (Norris, J., concurring). Sexual orientation is central
to a person's identity and does not change to fit the person's mood. Because of
this discrimination, and the minority status of homosexuals, the political
process is generally beyond reach. There are "social, economic, and political
pressures to conceal one's homosexuality" that prevent wide-spread
participation in the political sphere. Id. at 727 (Norris, J., concurring).
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sexual orientation cannot be denied all protection of the law. 64
However, it also means that same-sex couples can be denied the
ability to marry a partner 5or to even visit that partner in the
hospital 6 6 rights that traditional couples enjoy as fundamentalbecause the state can usually present some reason as to why
homosexuals should not be afforded these rights.67 States need only
show there is some legitimate interest for the law, and thus far
68
morality seems to be legitimate enough.
The Lawrence Court decided not to address the debate over
equal protection and the proper level of review because it could
decide the case on due process grounds.69 The majority merely
stated, "[w]ere we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition would
be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both
between same-sex and different-sex participants.' 70
Many
64. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 629-31 (1996). In Romer the Court
struck down a constitutional amendment that prohibited any ordinance or
action designed to protect homosexuals from discrimination. Id. at 635-36.
The Colorado constitutional amendment overturned in Romer "impose[d] a
special disability upon those persons alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the
safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint." Id. at 631.
65. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982) (refusing to
recognize same-sex marriage for immigration because Congress had a rational
basis to limit spousal status to heterosexual marriages); Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (marriage historically between a man and woman,
so no fundamental right to homosexual marriage).
66. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 870 (Vt. 1999).
67. See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. App. 2003).
68. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lawrence opines that
morality is a legitimate interest for due process challenges but not for equal
protection claims. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
For further discussion see infra note 70.
69. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. Recall that the Texas sodomy statute,

unlike the Georgia statute in question in Bowers, applied only to acts between
members of the same sex. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 18788, n.1, with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. It is interesting that the Court did not
decide the case on the narrower grounds of equal protection. See, e.g., Marcia
Coyle, Law.com, MeasuringHigh Court's Momentum, at

http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1059980425358 (Aug. 11, 2003).
70. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. The Court's statement does not make sense

as anything other than a way to avoid addressing the equal protection question
and as a way to balance its bold step in the due process analysis to avoid
looking illegitimate. If a prohibition were drawn to avoid equal protection
problems, due process would kick in to protect the fundamental rights of
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commentators and gay rights proponents would have liked to see the
Court address equal protection, and to increase the level of review
given to questions of sexual orientation. If the Court had overturned
the Texas law on both constitutional grounds the decision would
have a more solid footing. However, the Lawrence decision does at
least advance the availability of fundamental due process rights for
homosexuals. 7 1 Lawrence thus provides two avenues by which
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" may be overturned: repealing sodomy laws
and recognizing fundamental due process rights for homosexuals.

C. The Sensibility of "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell"
Even if "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is constitutional after
Lawrence, is it sensible? Many potential soldiers have been deterred
from entering the military because of the policy, and numerous
soldiers have been discharged.72 According to the Pentagon "more
privacy and personhood that are clearly guaranteed to heterosexual couples
(and now perhaps also to homosexuals). The prohibition as applied to
heterosexuals would thus be invalid, and the law would only affect
homosexuals. The equal protection clause would then kick in to invalidate the
entire prohibition. While this is circular, any such attempt to get around the
equal protection problem would quickly fail.
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor states that she would have
ruled that the Texas statute was unconstitutional based on the Equal Protection
Clause, but would have left Bowers intact. Id. at 579 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). O'Connor explained that the Texas law, which applied only to
homosexuals, could not be justified on morality grounds like the law in Bowers
(which applied to heterosexuals and homosexuals, thus only raising due
process questions) Id. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Moral disapproval
of [a] group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause."
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, even O'Connor would have applied
rational basis review, and O'Connor would continue to recognize morality as a
legitimate interest for Due Process questions. Id. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
71. The extent of due process rights that will be afforded to homosexuals is,
of course, unclear at this point, but will be developed over time. While the
Court never stated that it was creating a fundamental right, its entire discussion
is about liberty and freedom of choice. The Court protects these fundamental
rights and cannot even find a legitimate state interest to "justify [the state's]
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual," let alone a
compelling reason. Id. at 578.
72. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, US. Military's "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" Policy Panders to Prejudice, (Jan. 23, 2003), at http://hrw.org/press/
2003/01/us012303.htm.
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than 8,500 men and women... have been discharged from the
armed forces since the 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' policy came into
force in 1994." 73 And in 2001, "a record 1,256 servicemembers were
discharged because of their sexual orientation." 74
Although the policy provides an exception if "separation of the
member would not be in the best interest of the armed forces,, 75 the
exception is somewhat hollow because the same people that make
the rule enforce the rule.76 For example, "[b]etween October 2001
and September 2002, the Army discharged ten trained linguistsseven of them proficient in Arabic-because they are gay.",77 These
discharges came during the height of intelligence gathering following
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.78 Furthermore, the
military loses some very smart, active, and strong participants at a
large monetary cost. The General Accounting Office estimated that
the replacement cost per enlisted soldier (recruiting, training, and
other expenses) in the 1980s was approximately $28,000. 79 The
replacement cost for an officer was approximately $120,700.80
These figures are, of course, much larger today-more than two
decades later.
Many people, including the former Judge Advocate General for
the Navy, Rear Admiral John D. Hutson, have concluded in the
intervening years since the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was
enacted that the policy does not work, and that the concerns

73. abcNEWS.com, Not Fit to Fight? (Jan. 30, 2003), at http://abcnews.

go.com/sections/primetime/DailyNews/gays__military_030130.html.
74. Human Rights Watch, supra note 72; see also LEHRING, supra note 22,

at 139-41 (comparing the number of people discharged from 1990-2001 and
the percentage of discharges per military branch).

75. 10 U.S.C. § 654(e)(2) (2000).
76. Id. § 654(e) (specifying that application of this exception must be
determined in accordance with "regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
Defense").

77. Human Rights Watch, supra note 72; see also Q-online, US Army
Expels 9 Translatorsfor Being Gay (Nov. 18, 2002), at http://www.q.co.za/

2001/2002/11/18-usmilitary.html (discussing how the expulsion of gay
linguists is a "vivid illustration of how 'don't ask, don't tell' and anti-gay
discrimination harms the national security of the United States and the war on
terrorism.").
78. See Q-online, supra note 77.
79. Haggerty, supra note 22, at 35; LEHRING, supra note 22, at 133.
80. Haggerty, supra note 22, at 35.
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originally addressed by the policy may not hold weight.8 ' In 1995
President Clinton signed an executive order prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the awarding of
security clearances.8 2 Following the signing of that order "the CIA,
NSA and FBI have not forbidden openly gay people from joining
their organizations, as the Pentagon does. 8 3 The CIA has not had
problems with openly gay agents, even those in the field, and in 2000
held a gay pride celebration at Langley, the CIA headquarters, to
reflect their commitment to nondiscrimination.8 4 The effectiveness
of gay agents in these agencies is an indication that the unit cohesion
and morale problems alleged by the military are not, in reality, a
concern.
Furthermore, at least twenty-four major military powers
worldwide, including Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, and Israel, allow openly gay soldiers.8 5 The Center for the
Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military "has published studies on
the Israeli, British, Australian and Canadian militaries since they
81. Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, Senior
Admiral Says Lifting Gay Ban Would Strengthen Military: Former Navy
JAG Calls 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' "Odious" (Aug. 21, 2003), at
http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/PressCenter/press -rel 2003_0821.htm
[hereinafter Senior Admiral Says Lifting Gay Ban Would Strengthen Military].

82. See Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, As More
Intelligence Agents Work with Military Personnel, Scholars Question
Rationale for Pentagon's Gay Ban: CIA May be Model for Loosening
Restrictions on Gay Soldiers (July 15, 2002), at http://www.gaymilitary.

ucsb.edu/PressCenter/press-reL_2002_0717.htm
[hereinafter
As
More
Intelligence Agents Work with Military Personnel, Scholars Question
Rationalefor Pentagon 's Gay Ban]. However, if someone has already been
"discharged or dismissed from the Armed Forces under dishonorable
conditions" (including discharge on the basis of sexual orientation) that person
may be denied security clearance by the Department of Defense. 10 U.S.C. §
986(c)(4) (2000); 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000).

83. See As More Intelligence Agents Work with Military Personnel,
Scholars Question Rationalefor Pentagon's Gay Ban, supra note 82.

84. Id.
85. Human Rights Watch, supra note 72; Center for the Study of Sexual
Minorities in the Military, Researchers See No Problems When U.S. Troops
Fight With Gay-Friendly British (May 14, 2003) at http://www.gaymilitary.
ucsb.edu/PressCenter/press_reL_2003_0513.htm. See generally Morris, supra
note 27 (discussing the less progressive attitude of the United States regarding
gays in the military and comparing U.S. cases to cases from the European
Court of Human Rights).
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lifted their gay bans, which conclude that allowing gays to serve
openly does not undermine military readiness."86 In fact, throughout
history military groups have allowed and even heralded gay
soldiers.8 7 For example, homosexuality was introduced to young
Spartan men as part of their training. 88 In fourth-century Greece,
homosexual lovers formed an effective battalion called the Sacred
Band. 89 Some have even argued that homosexual
soldiers were
90
better warriors because of their love and devotion.
There are many reasons to question both the constitutionality
and the sensibility of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell". However, the law
currently exists and it is enforced. The existence of "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" leads to policy conflicts that will be discussed in depth in
the following sections.
III. THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT
A. The CurrentState of the Law
The federal government provides billions of dollars every year
to universities for research in numerous fields and to students for
financial aid.91 However, the Solomon Amendment limits receipt of
86. Senior Admiral Says Lifting Gay Ban Would Strengthen Military, supra
note 81.

87. See, e.g., The History Net, Introduction to Ancient Greek Eroticism
(describing homosexuality in Greece and Sparta, citing to Homosexual Eros in
Early Greece and Plato's Symposium), at http://ancienthistory.about.com/
library/weekly/aa072099.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
88. Id. (citing HomosexualEros in Greece).
89. Id.; Paul Halsall, Homosexuality in Early Greece (1986) (unpublished
graduate student course essay), available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/
pwh/greekeros.html.
90. See supra note 89.
91. Federal financial aid has increased from eleven billion dollars in 1970
to fifty-six billion dollars in fiscal year 2001. See Congressional Budget Office,
Staff Working Papers: Trends in College Tuition and Student Aid Since 1970
(Dec. 1988) at 16-17, available at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/49xx/doc4958/doc16.pdf;
Congressional Budget Office, Private and Public Contributionsto Financing

College Education (Jan. 2004), available at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/49xx/doc4984/
01-23-Education.pdf. Federal research funding obligations to universities and
colleges increased from over ten billion dollars in 1994 to more than nineteen
billion dollars in 2002. See National Science Foundation, Division of Science
Resources Studies, Federal Funds for Research and Development, Detailed
Historical Tables: Fiscal Years 1951-2002, tbl. 20. Federal obligations to
university and college performers for research, by agency: fiscal years 1970-
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these funds to those universities that allow military training and
recruiting programs on campus. 92 The Solomon Amendment
provides that any institution, or subelement of an institution, that
prevents military training or recruiting access will be denied funding
from the Departments of Defense, Transportation, Labor, Health and
Human Services, and Education.93 The Solomon Amendment and its
enforcing regulations have become increasingly problematic for
institutions of higher education.
The Solomon Amendment was originally enacted in 1995 in an
atmosphere of policy conflicts between the military and universities.
As originally enacted, the Solomon Amendment applied only to
funds provided by the Department of Defense.94 It was also
interpreted as distinguishing between subelements of an institution so
that if one subelement-the law school, for example-refused access
to military recruiters, only the law school would lose funding. 95
Many law schools at the time maintained nondiscrimination policies
that included sexual orientation, and partially implemented these
policies by limiting or refusing on-campus recruiting access to any
employer, including the military, that retained discriminatory hiring
practices. 96 Most continued to honor their nondiscrimination policies
2002, at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/nsfO3325/pdf/hist20.pdf (Aug. 2003). The
Departments of Defense, Transportation, Labor, Health and Human Services,
and Education alone funded $6.8 billion in 1994 and $14.8 billion in 2002. See
id.
92. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000).
93. 10 U.S.C. § 983 provides in part:
(b) DENIAL OF FUNDS FOR PREVENTING MILITARY RECRUITING ON
CAMPUS.-No funds described in subsection (d)(2) may be provided

by contract or by grant (including a grant of funds to be available for
student aid) to an institution of higher education (including any
subelement of such institution) if the Secretary of Defense determines
that that institution (or any subelement of that institution) has a policy
or practice.

. . that

either prohibits, or in effect prevents-

(1) the Secretary of a military department or Secretary of
Transportation from gaining entry to campuses, or access to
students (who are 17 years of age or older) on campuses, for
purposes of military recruiting ....
Id.

94. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No.
103-337, § 558, 108 Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994); see also Law, supranote 9.
95. See id. at 121.

96. See id. at 120-21.
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despite the Solomon Amendment because little funding came to law
schools through the Department of Defense, and
parent institutions
97
were not affected by the subelement's practice.
However, in the face of these opposing subunits, Congress
updated the Solomon Amendment in 1997 to apply to funding from
the Departments of Transportation, Labor, Health and Human
Services, and Education.98 This change created a larger threat to law
schools and institutions of higher education in general, because it
threatened federal financial aid. 99 Most law schools recognized that
they would be unable to attract students, especially with the rising
costs of education, if students were unable to receive financial aid. 00
However, the Association of American Law Schools (AALS), which
consists of approximately 165 member schools, 10 ' required members
to comply with its policy of nondiscrimination. 10 2 The AALS
97. See infra note 141 and accompanying text; Law, supra note 9, at 121.
98. Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. No 104-208 § 514, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009270 to 3009-272; Law, supra note 9, at 121-22. In 1996 Congress also
amended Title 10 of the United States Code by adding section 983-this
section denied funding from the Department of Defense as well as those
departments listed in 110 Stat. 3009, to any institution that maintained an antiROTC policy. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000); see also Solomon Amendment
Response and Protest, Rules and Regulations: Initial Regulations Interpreting
the Solomon Amendment, § 216.4 (1997) (discussing funding restrictions
imposed by 108 Stat. 2663 and 110 Stat. 3009), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/Rules.html.
In 1999 the various
sections discussed were recodified and consolidated in section 983 of Title 10
of the United States Code. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 549, 113 Stat. 512, 609-11 (1999).
99. See Law, supra note 9, at 122.
100. See id.
101. Association of American Law Schools, What is the AALS?, at http://
www.aals.org/about.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
102. The bylaws state:
b. A member school shall pursue a policy of providing its students and
graduates with equal opportunity to obtain employment, without

discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion,

national origin, sex, age, disability, or sexual orientation. A member
school shall communicate to each employer to whom it furnishes
assistance and facilities for interviewing and other placement
functions the school's firm expectation that the employer will observe
the principle of equal opportunity.
Association of American Law Schools, Bylaws of the Association of American
Law Schools, Inc. § 6-3 (adopted Dec. 29, 1971; amended through Jan. 5,
2004), available at http://www.aals.org/bylaws.html (last visited Jan. 16,
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realized that the law schools were being forced to abandon their
policies and therefore allowed each school to create an exception
allowing military recruiters on campus as long as the school provided
"amelioration" that expressed its disapproval of the military's
discrimination policy. °3 Many law schools continued to exclude all
employers that maintained discriminatory hiring practices except the
military, which they were forced to allow to recruit on campus,
despite the policy conflicts.
The situation improved in 1999 with the passage of the FrankCampbell Amendment, which stated that penalties do not apply to
funds "available solely for student financial assistance or related
administrative costs."' 104 As a result of this amendment many
schools were once again able to turn away military recruiters because
financial aid was no longer threatened.' 0 5 The AALS "reinstituted its
policy requiring that accredited schools prohibit discriminatory
employers, including the military,
from using law school placement
10 6
services."
and
facilities
office
Unfortunately, this reprieve did not last long. On January 13,
2000, interim regulations were adopted that defined "institution" as
including subelements.10 7
The result was that if even one
subelement, such as the law school, refused access to military
recruiters, the entire school risked losing funds. With millions of
dollars in funding for research and administration typically coming

2004). The AALS added sexual orientation to the policy by unanimous vote in
1990. See Law, supra note 9, at 121; Association of American Law Schools
Section on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Issues, What are the AALS
Policies About the Solomon Amendment and What Action Does the Section
Recommend?, at http://home.pacbell.net/pkykwan/AALS/section.htm (last
visited Nov. 1, 2003).
103. Statement by Carl Monk, supra note 13 (to provide "amelioration,"
member schools "should assure that all students... are informed each year
that the military discriminates on a basis not permitted by the school's
nondiscrimination rules"); Law, supranote 9, at 122-23.
104. Act of Oct. 25, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-79, § 8120, 113 Stat. 1212, 1260.
105. See Law, supra note 9, at 123.
106. Id.; see Memorandum from Carl Monk, AALS Executive Director, to
Deans of AALS Member and Fee-Paid Schools, Executive Committee Policy
Regarding "Solomon Amendment" (Jan. 24, 2000), at http://www.aals.org/002.html.
107. See Federal Acquisition Regulations System, 48 C.F.R. § 209.470-1
(2003); Law, supra note 9, at 123.
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from these federal departments, 10 8 institutions, and each subelement,
were constructively forced to allow military recruiters on campus.
The AALS returned to its policy of amelioration so that its 165
member schools would not be forced to exit the organization. 10 9 The
interim regulations became final in July 2002.110 Furthermore,
recent interpretations of the Frank-Campbell Amendment indicate
that financial aid in the form of work study and Perkins grants may
be removed if an institution refuses access to military recruiters since
these programs benefit the student and the school."' As a result,
institutions such as independent law schools that may not have been
affected by the other 2funding conditions are also forced to allow
recruiters on campus. 1
As it now stands, an institution (whether in its entirety or as a
subelement) that denies access to military recruiters or ROTC stands
to lose, at minimum, research funding from the Department of
Defense. Any subelement that denies access stands to lose funding
from the Departments of Defense, Labor, Health and Human
Services, and Education. In the more likely scenario, research and
capital improvement funding from all of the listed departments will
be denied to the entire institution if even one subelement of the
institution refuses access. Additionally, work-study programs and
Perkins grants will not be supported. In the worst-case scenario, all
of the previously mentioned funding will be denied as well as all
federal financial aid, in spite of the Frank-Campbell Amendment.
This area has been quite volatile and reactionary; thus far the
military, through Congress, has been able to restrict funding to
institutions of higher education at its whim, 113 so it is not hard to
108. See infra notes 114-123 and accompanying text.
109. See Solomon Amendment Response and Protest,

The AALS

Commitment to Nondiscriminationand the AALS' Amelioration Requirement,

at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/Commitment.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2004).
110. Federal Acquisition Regulations System, 48 C.F.R. § 209 (2003);
Solomon Amendment Response and Protest, July 2002 Final Regulations, at
www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/.
111. See Brandon Bigelow, Law Student Division Assembly Tackles Student
Loans, Affirmative Action, and Education Financing,STUDENT LAWYER (Oct.

1999), availableat http://www.abanet.org/lsd/stulawyer/oct99/offspeak.html.
112. See Law, supra note 9, at 122.
113. The power of the government to restrict funding under the Spending
Clause is discussed in Part IV.
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imagine that it could further restrict funding if it saw a threat of nonaccess.
Moreover, what constitutes non-access has not been clearly
stated. Refusing to allow military recruiters on campus at all when
other employers are allowed surely fits within the regulation. But
what if students protest near the interviewing rooms or take all
interview slots for the purpose of thwarting recruitment? What if the
law school's amelioration policy has the effect of turning students
away from military interviews? Could such actions be interpreted as
action by the school administration, either directly or through
ratification? These situations and others have yet to come to the
forefront, but the risk is apparent.
B. The Costs of Solomon
The Solomon Amendment is not an abstract, merely potential
threat to universities. The fiscal effect of Solomon reaches into the
hundreds of millions of dollars for each university. Moreover, the
constitutional impact squarely limits First Amendment freedoms.
Universities that have limited access to military recruiters in the past
have had to change their policies in response to military officials'
threats to pull funding. The costs of the Solomon Amendment are
described more fully in the following section.
1. Funding and Financial Aid
When the Air Force informed the University of Southern
California (USC) in May 2002 that USC was not in compliance with
the Solomon Amendment, the Air Force stated that "denial of
funding would result in the loss of approximately 300 to 500 million
dollars in federal funding to the University."' 1 4 Yale was told it
would lose $350 million.' 15 The University of Pennsylvania could
have lost $800 million. 1 6 Harvard estimated a loss of $328
114. Letter from Matthew L. Spitzer, Dean, USC Law School, to the USC
Law School Community (Aug. 19, 2002) (on file with author).
115. Outlaws @ Yale Law School, Projects, at http://www.yale.edu/lgblsa/
projects.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2004); Jessamyn Blau, Law Students, Faculty
Protest JAG Recruiters, YALE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 7, 2002, available at
http://www.yaledailynews.com/article.asp?AID= 19990.
116. Lambda Grads, What is JAG and What Does It Have to Do with the
Law School's NondiscriminationPolicy?, at http://dolphin.upenn.edu/-lgrads/

jag.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
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million. 1 7 For the 2002-2003 academic year, the University of
California, Santa Barbara received approximately $91 million,
roughly seventy percent of its research budget, from federal
funding." 8 A Boston Globe article in November 2002 estimated that
the threat of loss to Columbia, Harvard and Yale combined was $1
9
billion."
The National Institutes of Health (NIH), a division of the United
States Department of Health and Human Services, supports research
and medical institutions across the country. 120 Its 1998 funding level
was approximately $2.75 billion, and President Bush proposed to
double this funding by fiscal year 2003.121 Brown University alone
received nearly $50 million over a two-year period. 22 In addition,
the NIH offers to repay up to $35,000 per year of qualified
education
123
career.
research
two-year
a
to
debt for those that commit
In 1996 the American Bar Association reported that 140 schools
each received on average $82,810 in work-study funding. 124 Workstudy and Perkins loans are administered by the federal government
125
and by the individual school-both pay a portion of the funding.
Other federal financial aid programs include Pell grants (maximum
$4000 per year), Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity
Grants ($100-$4000 per year), and Stafford loans (maximum for
117. See The AALS Commitment to Nondiscrimination and the
AALS' Amelioration Requirement, supra note 109, at http://www.law.
georgetown.edu/solomon/Commitment.html.

118. University of California at Santa Barbara Office of Budget and
Planning, 2002-03, InstitutionalResearch and Planning,Campus Profile (Feb.
2003), http://bap.ucsb.edu/IR/campus-profiles.html.
119. Patrick Healy, Despite Concerns, Law Schools Admit Military

Recruiters, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 12, 2002, at Al.
120. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, National Institutes of Health,
About NIH, at http://www.nih.gov/about/ (last modified Jan. 29, 2004).
121. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Secretary
Thompson Promotes Increased Research Funding (Mar. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/200l0309.html.

122. Id.
123. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, National Institutes of Health,
Grants & Funding Opportunities, at http://grantsl.nih.gov/grants/index.cfm

(last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
124. Statement by Carl Monk, supra note 13.
125. U.S. Department of Education, The Student Guide: FinancialAid from
the US. Department of Education 2003-2004, available at http://www.

studentaid.ed.gov/students/attachments/siteresources/StudentGuideEnglish200
3_04.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
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undergraduate and graduate study combined is $138,500).126 The
average student accumulates $15,000-$17,000 in loan debt while
pursuing a four-year Bachelor's degree. 127 The average student
accumulates an additional
$61,000-$73,500 in loan debt to pursue a
28
professional degree.'
2. Chilled Speech
As discussed more fully in Part III.B.2, the Solomon
Amendment chills university speech by diluting the message sent by
the university. 129 Furthermore, it potentially chills student speech.
While the Amendment does not specifically forbid protests or
educational events, depending upon the scope of such activities, the
Department of Defense could interpret them as effectively blocking
military access to the campus.
The extent to which each institution has been able to enforce its
nondiscrimination policy has varied with the modifications of the
Solomon Amendment.
For example, "[iun 1978, New York
University School of Law (N.Y.U. Law) became the first
[educational institution] in the United States to deny access to
placement services for employers who openly discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation."'1 30 It adhered to this policy until October
16, 2000, when financial concerns resulting from the Solomon
31
Amendment forced it to allow military recruiters on campus. 1
Likewise, the University of Southern California Law School
(USC) has long required "employers who use [the] Career Services
Office ("CSO") to certify that they do not discriminate in violation of
[the school's anti-discrimination] policy."' 32 USC did not block
recruiters with discriminatory practices from interviewing and hiring
its students, but it did not allow those employers to recruit in the
126. Id.
127. American Council on Education, FrequentlyAsked Questions (based on
the 1999-2000 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study), at http://www.
acenet.edu/faq/viewlnfo.cfin?faqlD=21 (last modified Jan. 15, 2004).
128. Id.
129. Part IV.B explains that universities are expressive associations-an
organization that conveys a message and is thus protected by the First
Amendment guarantee of free speech.

130. Law, supra note 9, at 120.
131. See id. at 128.
132. Letter from Matthew L. Spitzer, Dean, supra note 114.
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same locations as other employers during the on-campus
interviewing program. 33 After the Solomon Amendment was
enacted USC stood by its policy and procedures. 34 However, when
university-wide funding was threatened, USC was forced to create a
policy exception-it provided military materials to students along
with all other recruiting information, and it allowed the military to
arrange interview space at the ROTC offices on campus (other
employers interviewed students at a hotel across the street). 135 Some
recruiters challenged USC's practice, but until 2002 USC was
ultimately deemed in compliance with Solomon. 36 Then, on May
30, 2002, USC received a letter from the Air Force stating that the
school was not in compliance with Solomon and had one month to
fix the situation or the Air Force would recommend that the
Secretary of Defense deny funding. 137 After numerous discussions
and pleas, USC was forced
to allow the military to participate fully
138
in all recruiting programs.
Similarly, the fall of 2002 marked the opening to military
recruiters of many campuses that had previously fought to remain
closed:
"Boston University, Columbia, Harvard, New York
University... Western New England College, Yale, and five other
schools also have either changed their nondiscrimination policies or
taken other steps to accommodate military recruiters." 139 The
University of Pennsylvania School of Law also opened its doors to
military recruiters in 2002 due to the threat that up to $800 million
could be pulled from the institution. 140 Three independent law
schools--Golden Gate, Vermont Law School, and William Mitchell
College of Law-have managed to maintain the full force of their
anti-discrimination policies (at least following the Frank-Campbell
Amendment removing restrictions on most financial aid) because

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

138. Id.
139. Healy, supra note 119.
140. Jon Passaro, Law Students Protest Military Recruitment, THE DAILY
PENNSYLvANIAN (Sept. 16, 2003), available at http://www.dailypennsylvania.

com/vnews/display.v/ART/2003/09/16/3f66cbe2b2873?in_archive=1.
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they receive little federal funding.14 1 Virtually every school has now
14 2
been forced to abandon or dilute its nondiscrimination policy.

While the texts of most policies remain intact, the message has
changed.
Students have reacted in various ways. In January 2002,
approximately twenty protestors stood with arms locked outside the
Judge Advocate General Corps (JAG) interview rooms at New York
University School of Law. 143 They asked each student that came for
an interview a few questions about his or her knowledge of "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell," then allowed the student to pass. 44 The Vice Dean
warned protestors that he would take disciplinary action if the
demonstrators prevented the interviews from taking place after one
interviewee threatened a protestor with physical violence. 45 Some
students also signed up for interview slots to confront JAG
recruiters. 46
In September 2003 approximately 100 students
gathered at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law to protest
JAG interviews. 47 Thus far the military has not reacted to these
protests, but students are unsure of the effect their actions will have
under the Solomon Amendment because of the volatile history of the
amendment. For example, in October 2002 a group of Loyola Law
School students wanted to conduct a protest similar to those at
NYU. 48 However, the idea was vetoed because both students and
the administration were concerned about the potential149reaction of the
government and members of the Loyola community.
141. Healy, supra note 119.
142. See Law, supra note 9, at 128.
143. John Woods, Military Recruiting at Law School Triggers Protest Over

Gay Rights, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL (Feb. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.amsa.org/adv/lgbtpm/postings2.cfm?id=6 (last visited Jan. 15,
2004). A similar protest occurred at NYU in October 2000, when the school
allowed access to a military recruiter for the first time in twenty-two years.
Law, supra note 9, at 128. Gay and Lesbian students filled all the interview
slots-some discussed policies, others interviewed as if they were straight. Id.
A second JAG recruiter canceled his visit when students boycotted by not
signing up for interviews. Id.
144. Woods, supranote 143.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Passaro, supra note 140.
148. Contact author for more information.
149. Interview with David Burcham, Dean, Loyola Law School of Los
Angeles (Mar. 2, 2004).
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IV. SOLOMON AND THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS

A. The Doctrine of UnconstitutionalConditions
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is implicated when
the government restricts receipt of federal money to those willing to
surrender a constitutional right.15 0 Congress has the power pursuant
to the Spending Clause to allocate federal money for a wide variety
of programs.' 5 1 While no one has a right to government benefits,
once the government chooses to offer a benefit it generally cannot
condition receipt on surrender of a constitutional right. 152 One
exception
is if the government's interest outweighs the right at
153
issue.

Case law regarding unconstitutional conditions conveys two
basic principles: (1) if the condition is placed on a potential recipient
rather than on a federal program, constitutional questions arise; and
(2) if the government is the speaker, the government can take steps to
make sure its message is clearly conveyed.' 5 4 However, the
application of these principles is somewhat perplexing.
150. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 395 (1998); TRIBE, supra
note 43, § 10-8, at 681; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 HARv. L. REv. 1415, 1415 (1988-1989).
151. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8.

152. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003)
("'the government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected... freedom of speech" even if he has no
entitlement to that benefit."' (quoting Board of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996))); Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d
925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995) ("It is well established that 'even though a person has
no "right" to a valuable government benefit and even though the government
may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons
upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a
person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interestsespecially, his interest in freedom of speech."' (quoting Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972))); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991); see
also Sullivan, supra note 150, at 1415.
153. 16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 395 (1998); Sullivan, supra note
150, at 1415, 1419 (the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is important
because by balancing indirect effect on liberty against justification, the
doctrine prevents the government from accomplishing indirectly what it cannot
accomplish directly).
154. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001);
Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). The term "government
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For example, in Rust v. Sullivan15 5 the Court upheld a Title X
program that provided funds for family planning as long as the
provider did not counsel or provide abortions. 156 The Court
determined that the restriction was on the program, which had
limited funds, and not on the recipient-if Title X funds were used
157
for a consultation, abortion counseling could not be provided.
However, the very same medical provider could counsel abortions if
the patient paid the consultation fee, or another program supported
the visit.158
In addition, the Court concluded that Congress
specifically implemented the Title X program for pre-pregnancy
planning; thus abortion counseling did not fit within the scope of the
program. 59 Furthermore, the Court found that Congress determined
abortion counseling was not in the public interest.16° In other words,
the government chose to advocate a specific message when it
implemented Title X.
Subsequently, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
University of Virginia,161 the Court struck down a university payment
policy that excluded payments to a student group "for the sole reason
that their student paper 'primarily promotes or manifests a particular
belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.' 1 62 The Court
determined that the plan was viewpoint discriminatory-payments
were excluded because of the message of the publication. 163 Because
the funds were provided to private speakers, student groups, the

speaker" includes when the government is using private speakers to convey a
government message. Id.
155. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
156. Id. at 177-78.
157. Id. at 196.
158. Id. The dissent thought the Court's holding supported "viewpoint-based
suppression of speech" because it unconstitutionally imposed upon individuals
dependent on the government who could not pay out-of-pocket for the
consultation. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
159. "Congress intended Title X funds 'to be used only to support preventive
family planning services."' Id. at 179.

160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 201.
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
Id. at 822-23.
Id. at 828-29, 837.
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University did not convey a message and thus had no reason to
interfere with the First Amendment."
In a final example, the Court struck down a condition on a legal
services program. In 1974 Congress established the non-profit Legal
Services Corporation to distribute funds to organizations that would
provide free legal assistance in non-criminal proceedings and
matters. 165 However, funds were not available if the representation
involved an effort to challenge existing welfare laws. 166 The Court
determined that this restriction constituted an unconstitutional
condition in part because the "program was designed to facilitate
private speech, not to promote a governmental message."' 167 It thus
focused on the speaker element rather than upon whom the condition
was placed. The Court noted that a lawyer who obtains funding from
Legal Services Corporation (LSC) acts for his or her client, and does
not speak for the government.
It stated that "[t]he private nature
of the speech involved here, and the extent of LSC's regulation of
private expression, are indicated further... [w]here the government
169
uses or attempts to regulate a particular medium."'
These examples illustrate the principles of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, but some question how the decisions are
distinguishable. For example, why did Legal Services seem to
presume that the condition was on the recipient and not on the
program like in Rust? How does the lawyer differ from the doctor?
Is Legal Services distinguishable because it involves the judicial
system? Does Rust differ because the issue in question was abortion
funding? These questions remain unanswered, but the principles are
clear: if the condition is on the recipient, Congress has little latitude,
but if the funds support a government speaker, the government has
wide latitude to ensure that its message is projected.
These principles can be applied to the Solomon Amendment
without confusion, despite the perplexing precedent. First, the
Solomon Amendment places a condition squarely on the recipient
164. Id. at 833-34. University of Virginia ("UVA") is a state-run university
and is thus the government actor in this case. Id. at 822. Allowing private
religious speech did not implicate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 846.
165. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536 (2001).
166. Id. at 536-37.
167. Id. at 542.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 543.
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and not on any particular program.' 70 The "program" consists of
hundreds of different funds and grants that are allocated to help
students pay for college and for university researchers to discover
important new techniques and cures. 171 Had the funds been allocated
to universities for recruiting purposes, with a restriction that if the
university allowed on campus recruiting it had to allow the military
to participate, then it would look more like a condition on a program.
Instead, the Solomon Amendment clearly tells the recipient of
distinct funds that it must do something unrelated to the reason for
those funds in order to keep the funds.
Second, the government neither speaks nor conveys a specific
message when it awards research funding. The question here is not
whether the government sends a message through Solomon, but
whether the government sends a message when it funds a research
program. 172 The government does assert that it wants scientific
progress, but that is too broad of a message to be in question here. In
fact, the various research programs that are funded by the
government are often in conflict, and thus it would be impossible for
the government to send one specific message.
Instead, the
government provides funds for university researchers to speak
through their studies. 173 Thus, the government does not have to
ensure that its message is clearly conveyed because it does not send a
specific message.
Accordingly, the government has placed a condition on the
recipients of federal research funding, each of which conveys its own
170. 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2000).
171. See id. § 983(d).
172. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions deals with restrictions on
funding, and the message sent by the government when it chooses to fund one
program over another. Solomon may take away funding, but it does not grant
funding. Thus, it is necessary to look at the underlying funding program.
173. Some may argue that this analysis differs for state-run universities since
state-run universities are, in a way, an arm of the government. However,
distinguishing between universities in this way creates an unnecessary
complication. Even if a state-run university is in some way the government in
some situation, there is still no overall governmental message conveyed by
awarding research funding. Additionally, the researchers, while employed by
the university, clearly have some independent, private interest. Furthermore,
the research is usually supported in part by private funds. The state could,
perhaps, require military training and recruiting on campus as part of
maintaining the state-run university, but the goal cannot be accomplished
through restraints on federal research funding.

Spring 2004]

"DON'TASK, DON'T TELL" & SOLOMON

1363

message, and none of which convey a particular governmental
message. 174 Therefore, if Solomon forces universities to surrender
their constitutional rights, it constitutes an unconstitutional condition
unless the government 175
has an interest that outweighs the
issue.
at
right
constitutional
B. The Universities'Asserted Rights: Expressive Association
Organizations, including universities, may receive First
Amendment protection through recognition as expressive
associations.
An expressive association conveys a message, a
form of expression, and thus engages in speech-it projects
information to those near the speaker. In recent years the idea of
expressive association has shifted from focusing on the rights of
individuals associating as a group, to the rights of the group
independent of the individuals.177 Freedom of association "plainly
presupposes a freedom not to associate. ' 178 Moreover, it is important
to realize that an organization does not have to exist solely for the
purpose of spreading a particular message, and not every member of
the organization must agree with the policy for expressive
association to exist. 179 "An association 180
must merely engage in
expressive activity that could be impaired."'
The level to which the right to expressive association is
protected is partially dependent on the character of the
organization.' 8' The government can regulate a corporation formed
174. There may be some exception for researchers working on Department
of Defense contracts or developing specific research for a government purpose.
175. 16A AM. JUR. 2D CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 395 (1998).
176. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
177. Compare Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648-50 (2000)
(focusing on the rights of the Boy Scouts as a group that engages in
"expressive activity") with Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(focusing on the individual rights of parents to choose schools for their
children).
178. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
179. Dale, 530 U.S. at 654-55.
180. Id. at 655.
181. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (holding that commercial speech is subject to
intermediate scrutiny); 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 483 (1998).

Corporate speech is protected by the First Amendment just as individual
speech is protected. Id. § 467. However, the governmental interest in
regulating speech is more likely to outweigh a corporation's First Amendment
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solely to do business more than it can regulate a small organization
formed specifically to teach the concept of democracy to third world
countries, because we place more First Amendment value upon the
organization that is formed for expressive association.
Most
organizations fall somewhere in the middle of this spectrum-while
functioning
as a business, the organization develops a particular
182
mission.
For example, Ben & Jerry's Ice Cream Company is a profitable
corporation that is known for "incorporating wholesome, natural
ingredients" into its product and for its "nonpartisan social mission
that seeks to meet human needs and eliminate injustices in our local,
integrating these concerns
national and international communities ' by
83
activities."'
business
day-to-day
our
into
Similarly, many universities are known for incorporating certain
values into their educational missions. "We have long recognized
that, given the important purpose of public education and the
expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the
university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our
In Regents of the University of
constitutional tradition."' 184
California v. Bakke, 185 Justice Powell recognized that "[a]cademic
freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right,
long has been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment."' 186 Furthermore, the Court has stated that "the
university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to
the functioning of our society that the Government's ability to
control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to
the vagueness
the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by
' 87
Amendment."'
First
the
of
and overbreadth doctrines

interest than an individual's First Amendment interest. See id. § 480
("[C]ommercial speech enjoys a more limited measure of protection."). This is
particularly true when the organization does not exist to convey a particular

message. See id.
182. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
183. Ben & Jerry's, Our Mission Statement, at http://www.benjerry.com/

ourcompany/ourmission/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2004).
184. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
185. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
186. Id. at 312.
187. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
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From the above analysis, it is clear that a university is an
expressive association that deserves constitutional protection when it
conveys a message. However, that is not the end of the analysis. A
court must also determine if the government's interest in promoting
the military through funding restrictions significantly affects the
group's ability to advocate its viewpoint, and then balance the
government's interest against the burden imposed using strict
scrutiny.
C. The Effect of the Government's Interest-Promotingthe
Military-Ona University's Ability to Advocate Its Viewpoint
The government has an interest in promoting the military. This
interest extends from encouraging military service to enhancing
public relations with the military. In enacting the Solomon
Amendment, Congress and the military chose to advance this goal by
restricting funds expended for independent purposes-research and
financial aid. The question is whether this method significantly
affects a university's ability to advocate its message of
nondiscrimination. This Note concludes that it does, because the
university is forced to change its expressive message to avoid losing
hundreds of millions of dollars in funding.
The United States District Court in New Jersey recently
addressed this question following a motion for a preliminary
injunction in Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v.
Rumsfeld (FAIR litigation).18 8 In the FAIR litigation the plaintiffs
alleged that Solomon is an unconstitutional condition. The plaintiffs
requested a preliminary injunction to stop the enforcement of
Solomon, but the district court denied the request because it
concluded that the plaintiffs' chance of success on the merits was not
reasonably likely. 189 The district court reasoned that the Solomon
Amendment is not a direct restriction of speech and therefore the
19 °
differs from other unconstitutional conditions cases.
analysis
Furthermore, the universities' rights of expressive association were

188. 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003). FAIR is an association of law

schools and faculties. Other plaintiffs include the Society of American Law
Teachers ("SALT"), the Coalition for Equality, the Rutgers Gay and Lesbian

Caucus, law professors and law students. Id. at 275-76.
189. Id. at 274-75.
190. Id. at 315.
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not greatly infringed because Solomon did not require the military
recruiters to take leadership roles at the campuses, and the military
recruiters would only be on campus a few days each year. 19 '
However, the court's conclusion is flawed.
The court relied on Rust and similar cases that state, "when the
Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is
entitled to define the limits of that program.'' 92 The court
recognized that the Solomon Amendment does not create a specific
spending program and thus Congress's wide latitude to define was
more limited. 193 However, it also concluded that any interference
with speech was incidental because Solomon does not directly
exclude a particular point of view like the programs in Rust and
American Library Ass 'n. 194 But in determining whether the Solomon
Amendment infringed upon the universities' expressive rights the
court analyzed the wrong question. Instead of determining the effect
of forcing the schools to advocate a different policy, the court looked
of having a military recruiter on campus a few days
at the impact
195
each year.
By requiring a university to change its nondiscrimination policy,
provide amelioration, or ignore its policy, the Solomon Amendment
directly infringes upon each university's right to communicate a
message and exercise its right to free speech through expressive
association. The government requires the university to convey a
message of partial nondiscrimination by forcing the school to choose
its policy or hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funding. The
effect of this spreads over more than the few days the recruiter is
191. See id. at 310, 314.
192. Id. at 299.
193. Id. at 300.
194. Id.; cf Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1999) (holding that a Title X
program that provided funding for family planning but did not counsel or
provide abortions was constitutional); United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539
U.S. 194 (2003) (upholding the Children's Internet Protection Act, holding that
it does not impose an unconstitutional condition on public libraries). While
Solomon does not explicitly limit a viewpoint like these cases, it was
specifically created to stop universities from fully enforcing their
The driving force behind the Solomon
nondiscrimination policies.
Amendment was the conflict between "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and the
universities' policies. This implicit, background reasoning is still a clear
regulation of viewpoint.
195. Forumfor Academic & InstitutionalRights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
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actually on campus (even if that is when most attention is
concentrated on the policy) and significantly affects the university's
ability to advocate its message. The statement "non-discrimination
usually" is quite different from the statement "non-discrimination
always." As long as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is in place, the
196
Solomon Amendment forces universities to change their speech.
Some counter that free speech entitles people to express their
views, and to counter opposing views. They thus conclude that
although Solomon may be somewhat restrictive, it does not restrict
the school from verbally challenging the policy. However, being
able to speak against something is not the same as being able 197
to
convey one's message to others, to speak one's mind outright.
Solomon stops universities from stating a clear message of
nondiscrimination and thus significantly infringes upon their right to
expressive association.
D. Weighing the Government's Interest Against the Burden Imposed
on the University
It has been established that universities have a First Amendment
right to expressive association and that the Solomon Amendment
significantly interferes with the ability of the universities to advocate
their message of nondiscrimination. While Solomon appears to be
an unconstitutional condition, the remaining question is whether, on
balance, the government's interest in promoting the military exceeds
the infringement on the universities' rights to expressive association.
196. See Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education
and the Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1841, 1849-50 (2001)

("We should therefore attend not only to the ways that government, by
regulating associations' activities, burdens the expression of individuals. We
should also think and worry...

about whether and how government

supervision of associations' expression threatens, crowds out, and
commandeers their educational, soul-making role.").
197. As discussed in Part III.B, universities have been threatened with denial
of funds for denying recruiters on-campus access, and student protests have not
led to any change of policy. Furthermore, student and university speech has
been chilled by the fear that their speech may be interpreted as "prohibit[ing],
or in effect prevent[ing]" access to military recruiters. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000).
It is important to note that the speech in these scenarios is a message of
nondiscrimination.
It is not dangerous, or otherwise constitutionally
problematic. In fact, the nondiscrimination message the universities want to
send is generally considered a positive and desirable message.
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This question is answered by applying the strict scrutiny test: does
the government have a compelling interest that the program furthers
using the least restrictive means?
The district court in the FAIR litigation did not adequately
weigh the governmental interest against the burden imposed on a
university's free speech because it concluded that Solomon did not
significantly affect the ability of each university to advocate its
message. 198 However, having determined otherwise, it is appropriate
to apply strict scrutiny. Accoringly, this Note concludes that
although the government's interest in raising and maintaining a
military is compelling, Solomon is far from constituting the least
restrictive means of accomplishing this goal. Thus, Solomon is an
unconstitutional condition that is not made valid by the government's
interest.
Courts have had to balance the government's interest against the
burden imposed in many cases. For example, in Roberts v.
Jaycees199 the Court recognized that local chapters of the Jaycees (a
large organization formed for fraternal networking) did engage in
expressive association that would be impaired by the forced
inclusion of women in the organization. 20 0 However, the Court also
recognized that the Jaycees provided business contacts and
employment promotions, and that "[a]ssuring women equal access to
such goods, privileges, and advantages clearly furthers compelling
state interests." 20 ' Thus, the Court concluded that "Minnesota's
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female
citizens justifie[d] the impact that application of the statute to the
20 2
Jaycees may have on the male members' associational freedoms.
20 3
It also concluded that a less restrictive means was not available.
In the present situation the government clearly has a compelling
interest in raising and maintaining a military to protect our nation's
198. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d. at

313-14. The court determined that the compelling interest test should not
apply because Solomon does not directly affect associational rights. Id. at
310-11. Instead, the court applied the medium scrutiny test outlined in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Id. at 311.
199. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
200. Id. at 621.
201. Id. at 626.
202. Id. at 623.
203. Id.
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safety. However, Solomon fails to further this interest using the least
discriminatory means. First, the government has numerous ways to
recruit soldiers, including television ads, high school recruiting, bus
banners, mailings, word of mouth, and online recruiting tools.
Second, the "problem" Solomon addresses is not an inability to
recruit university students or law students, but is instead a
convenience problem.
Schools that exclude or limit military recruiting do not ban
students from taking jobs with the military. They merely ask the
military, and other discriminatory employers, to conduct interviews
off campus. While this is less convenient than conducting interviews
on campus, it does not eliminate a pool of applicants. Most schools
that limited access in the past permitted the military to place
advertisements for off-campus recruiting in the career services
offices, or to otherwise reach students to let them know the military
would be interviewing.
Given the various recruiting options discussed above, Solomon
does little to accomplish the overall goal of promoting the military,
and it does so in a very restrictive way-Solomon directly infringes
upon First Amendment rights. On balance, Solomon cannot
withstand constitutional scrutiny. If Congress and the military were
to eliminate "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," Solomon could be a valid
exercise of Congress' spending power, as long as it did not conflict
with any of the universities' other constitutional rights. 204 However,
because the underlying discrimination remains, Solomon is not a
valid spending regulation.
In conclusion, the government cannot show that its interests
outweigh the universities' right of expressive association. The
balancing test tips in favor of protecting the First Amendment
freedom of a university. Therefore, the Solomon Amendment is an
unconstitutional condition that must be struck down.
V. CONCLUSION

Our military has long discriminated on the basis of sexual
orientation, but society has become ever more accepting of
homosexuality.
Universities, the traditional spheres of free
204. This assumes that another discriminatory policy does not replace
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell."
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expression, took some of the initial steps in the societal
transformation
by adding
sexual
orientation
to
their
nondiscrimination policies. However, these policy changes have
placed universities in direct conflict with the military.
In order to successfully portray and advocate their message of
nondiscrimination, many universities, particularly law schools,
limited on-campus recruiting to those companies and organizations
that maintained a nondiscrimination policy equivalent to the
university's policy. Thus, discriminatory employers, including the
military, were not provided with on-campus recruiting resources.
Congress and the military reacted to this environment by enacting the
Solomon Amendment.
The Solomon Amendment forces universities to choose between
federal funding and fully advocating their messages of
nondiscrimination. Thus, for a university to receive federal aid, it
must surrender its First Amendment right to expressive association.
Therefore, Solomon is unconstitutional and cannot stand. It is
possible that Solomon could be saved if "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is
eliminated, which may transpire following the recent decision in
Lawrence v. Texas. By striking down sodomy laws, overturning
Bowers, and recognizing some fundamental due process rights for
homosexuals, the Court provided numerous grounds to attack
regulations that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
If the military did not discriminate, its policy would not conflict
with universities' policies of nondiscrimination. If a policy conflict
did not exist, universities would not have a First Amendment reason
to exclude the military from recruiting on campus. Furthermore, if
Solomon remained intact to reach those schools that continued
to exclude the military for non-First Amendment reasons, the
unconstitutional conditions claim would fail barring a different
infringement of constitutional rights. However, the military
does discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, and a
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First Amendment conflict does exist. Therefore, the Solomon
Amendment must be struck down as an unconstitutional condition.
Lindsay Gayle Stevenson
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